Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

by Daron Acemoglu , James A. Robinson
Format: Hardcover
Pub. Date: 2005-12-19
Publisher(s): Cambridge University Press
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Summary

This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization.

Table of Contents

Preface xi
PART ONE. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Paths of Political Development
1(14)
Britain
2(3)
Argentina
5(3)
Singapore
8(2)
South Africa
10(4)
The Agenda
14(1)
Our Argument
15(33)
Democracy versus Nondemocracy
16(3)
Building Blocks of Our Approach
19(3)
Toward Our Basic Story
22(1)
Our Theory of Democratization
23(7)
Democratic Consolidation
30(1)
Determinants of Democracy
31(11)
Political Identities and the Nature of Conflict
42(1)
Democracy in a Picture
43(3)
Overview of the Book
46(2)
What Do We Know about Democracy?
48(41)
Measuring Democracy
48(3)
Patterns of Democracy
51(7)
Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution
58(7)
Crises and Democracy
65(1)
Social Unrest and Democratization
65(10)
The Literature
75(5)
Our Contribution
80(9)
PART TWO. MODELING POLITICS
Democratic Politics
89(29)
Introduction
89(2)
Aggregating Individual Preferences
91(1)
Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem
92(7)
Our Workhorse Models
99(14)
Democracy and Political Equality
113(4)
Conclusion
117(1)
Nondemocratic Politics
118(55)
Introduction
118(2)
Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics
120(8)
Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies
128(5)
Commitment Problems
133(11)
A Simple Game of Promises
144(7)
A Dynamic Model
151(10)
Incentive-Compatible Promises
161(10)
Conclusion
171(2)
PART THREE. THE CREATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY
Democratization
173(48)
Introduction
173(1)
The Role of Political Institutions
173(3)
Preferences over Political Institutions
176(1)
Political Power and Institutions
177(4)
A Static Model of Democratization
181(5)
Democratization or Repression?
186(7)
A Dynamic Model of Democratization
193(8)
Subgame Perfect Equilibria
201(2)
Alternative Political Identities
203(4)
Targeted Transfers
207(1)
Power of the Elites in Democracy
207(4)
Ideological Preferences over Regimes
211(3)
Democratization in a Picture
214(1)
Equilibrium Revolutions
215(3)
Conclusion
218(3)
Coups and Consolidation
221(34)
Introduction
221(3)
Incentives for Coups
224(1)
A Static Model of Coups
225(6)
A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy
231(15)
Alternative Political Identities
246(1)
Targeted Transfers
246(1)
Power in Democracy and Coups
247(2)
Consolidation in a Picture
249(2)
Defensive Coups
251(2)
Conclusion
253(2)
PART FOUR. PUTTING THE MODELS TO WORK
The Role of the Middle Class
255(32)
Introduction
255(4)
The Three-Class Model
259(3)
Emergence of Partial Democracy
262(5)
From Partial to Full Democracy
267(6)
Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer
273(5)
Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners
278(5)
The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy
283(2)
Conclusion
285(2)
Economic Structure and Democracy
287(34)
Introduction
287(3)
Economic Structure and Income Distribution
290(2)
Political Conflict
292(1)
Capital, Land, and the Transition to Democracy
293(3)
Costs of Coup on Capital and Land
296(4)
Capital, Land, and the Burden of Democracy
300(7)
Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists
307(5)
Industrialists, Landowners, and Democracy in Practice
312(1)
Economic Institutions
313(3)
Human Capital
316(1)
Conjectures about Political Development
317(2)
Conclusion
319(2)
Globalization and Democracy
321(28)
Introduction
321(4)
A Model of an Open Economy
325(6)
Political Conflict -- Democratic Consolidation
331(3)
Political Conflict -- Transition to Democracy
334(4)
Financial Integration
338(5)
Increased Political Integration
343(1)
Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade
344(3)
Conclusion
347(2)
PART FIVE. CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY
Conclusions and the Future of Democracy
349(12)
Paths of Political Development Revisited
349(6)
Extensions and Areas for Future Research
355(3)
The Future of Democracy
358(3)
PART SIX. APPENDIX
Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy
361(20)
Introduction
361(1)
Probabilistic Voting Models
361(6)
Lobbying
367(6)
Partisan Politics and Political Capture
373(8)
Bibliography 381(20)
Index 401

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